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Imperfect Information, Monopolistic Competition, 
and Public Policy 
By ALAN SCHWARTZ AND LOUIS L. WILDE* 
Ever since the pioneering work of George 
Stigler (1961) and the provocative survey by 
Michael Rothschild (1973), economists have 
recognized that general equilibrium models 
yield competitive equilibria only by making 
strong assumptions about the information 
available to market participants. In response 
to this difficulty, theorists in recent years 
have developed a family of "search equi-
librium models" that presuppose homogene-
ity and the absence of price discrimination, 
and which also assume that information 
acquisition costs are positive for at least a 
subset of buyers. On the basis of these and 
other assumptions, the models attempt to 
show how price dispersion equilibria can arise 
solely as a result of the strategies that firms 
and consumers pursue. One author sum-
marized the results: "if information is costly, 
each small firm obtains market power" so 
that "The relevant market structure with 
imperfect information is not per/ ect competi-
tion but rather monopolistic competition" 
(Steven Salop, 1976, p. 240). 
That search costs are positive is of norma-
tive interest as well because those costs could 
generate supracompetitive prices. Policy 
analysts thus should want to know: (a) When 
is insufficient search, rather than other fac-
tors, likely to cause supracompetitive prices? 
(b) How can markets that behave badly for 
information reasons best be moved toward 
competitive equilibria? (c) When are the costs 
of regulation to cure this sort of market 
failure likely to exceed the welfare gains? 
Some theorists and most decision makers 
assume that the answer to question (a) is 
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"often, especially in consumer markets," a 
position that the evidence fails convincingly 
to sustain. Economists also seldom ask the 
last two questions. And decision makers have 
ignored question (c) while transmuting (b) 
into the inquiry whether the "typical" con-
sumer lacks any information that he or she 
would find useful in making a "rational" 
choice. If so, an information problem justify-
ing regulation is assumed to exist (Jonathan 
Landers, 1977; Landers and Ralph Rohner, 
1979). The economists' concentration on the-
ory and the policymakers' ignorance of eco-
nomics thus has produced a large amount of 
regulation, much of which might be unneces-
sary and most of which is expensive to ad-
minister and obey. 
The search equilibrium models alluded to 
focus attention on the strength of the infor-
mational assumptions that the neoclassical 
models make and on the potentially un-
pleasant normative consequences of relaxing 
those assumptions. These models, however, 
make strong assumptions of their own, in 
particular respecting the methods by which 
the consumers in them become informed and 
the nature of consumer expectations. Section 
I of this paper discusses the consequences of 
making assumptions of this sort, and it is 
argued that, because of them, most search 
equilibrium models do not readily yield us-
able policy instruments. Section II briefly 
sketches lines of research that seem interest-
ing positively and that may generate helpful 
normative conclusions. 
I 
A useful way to begin is with a slightly 
modified version of the original and widely 
cited Salop and Stiglitz model (1977). 1 Sup-
1A number of extensions and variations of the origi-
nal Salop and Stiglitz model have appeared. See our 
working paper for a further discussion of these. 
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pose that (i) arbitrarily large numbers of 
firms and consumers exist, with the con-
sumer/firm ratio endogenous; (ii) a homo-
geneous good is sold and consumed; (iii) no 
price discrimination occurs; (iv) consumers 
desire to purchase one unit of the good and 
will pay any price up to a common limit 
price (PL); (v) consumers have rational ex-
pectations in that they know the true distri-
bution of prices in a market when they begin 
to search, but do not know which firms 
charge these prices; (vi) consumers fall into 
two classes, as measured by the costs to them 
of becoming informed, with the low-cost 
group having information acquisition cost c1 
and the high-cost group having cost c2 , where 
c2 ~ c1 ~ O; (vii) becoming informed is 
viewed as purchasing and reading a news-
paper that reveals the relationship between 
firms and prices; (viii) consumers who be-
come informed always buy at the stores that 
charge the lowest price while consumers who 
do not become informed visit one store cho-
sen at random and buy if the price is less 
than or equal to the limit price; (ix) technol-
ogies are described by a fixed cost (F) and a 
marginal cost ( p) that is constant up to a 
particular capacity (s); (x) firms maximize 
profits and in equilibrium earn zero expected 
profits. 
Respecting Salop and Stiglitz's results, let 
p* =the competitive price= p + ( F / s ), and 
a= the proportion of consumers with low-
information acquisition costs ( c 1 ). Then a 
competitive equilibrium exists if and only if 
enough consumers have zero information 
acquisition costs-if c 1 = 0 and a > 1 -
[F/s(h - p)]. If these two conditions are 
not met, all firms charge the monopoly price 
if it never pays consumers to seek a lower 
price-if PL - p*.;;;; c1 .;;;; c2 ; otherwise, two-
price equilibria exist with the low price being 
p* and the high price being either p L or a 
price intermediate between p* and p L; or, no 
equilibrium exists. 
There are four related difficulties with 
work of this sort. First, the particular ra-
tional expectations assumption used is 
strong; before they begin to search, con-
sumers never know and could not know the 
entire price distribution unless they also knew 
the identity of the firms charging these prices. 
Second, the institution by which consumers 
become informed-buying a newspaper that 
contains all relevant information-does not 
exist. Third, nonexistence may occur more 
frequently than the authors suppose, because 
on this model's assumptions it is unlikely 
that two distinct groups of consumers will 
exist. Since consumers are assumed to be 
identical in all respects except analytical abil-
ity and the opportunity cost of time, two 
groups of consumers will exist only if the 
high-cost group has considerably less ability 
than the low-cost group to read the news-
paper and match what they know is the 
lowest price to the name of the firm that 
charges it, or if the high-cost group attaches 
a much greater value to the twenty or so 
seconds it will take to do this than the low-
cost group does. Because either possibility is 
implausible, only one consumer group actu-
ally would exist; everyone in this model 
would buy the newspaper and be perfectly 
informed or no one would. And since the 
authors show that a competitive equilibrium 
cannot exist when c1 > 0, there will either be 
a monopoly equilibrium or nonexistence. 
Fourth, the particular rational expectations 
assumption used reduces the model's policy 
significance. Policymakers commonly per-
ceive themselves as having to choose between 
regulating a transaction to achieve a desired 
outcome or reducing search costs to improve 
the outcomes markets reach. Whether the 
"regulation" or "disclosure" option should 
be chosen is in part a function of the nature 
of the equilibria that would be produced if 
information acquisition costs were reduced. 
These costs never can be reduced to zero, 
and the rational expectations assumption 
then implies that competitive equilibria are 
impossible but the authors do not otherwise 
indicate what the effect of reducing search 
costs would be. Thus it is difficult to draw 
insights from their theoretically interesting 
model that would illuminate the choice be-
tween regulation and disclosure. In addition, 
the model cannot generate criteria that deci-
sion makers can use to characterize observed 
behavior because it yields nonexistence over 
relevant ranges of the underlying parameters. 
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More recent work has advanced the Salop 
and Stiglitz analysis; however, it too makes 
strong assumptions about methods of infor-
mation acquisition and about the strategies 
that some of the economic actors pursue. Hal 
Varian ( 1980), for example, supposes unin-
formed consumers to visit one store at ran-
dom and purchase if the price they see equals 
or is less than the limit price, and informed 
consumers to shop at the stores charging the 
lowest price. Consumers again become in-
formed by reading a newspaper that com-
municates the relationship between firms and 
prices, but the decision to become informed 
is taken to be exogenous. Finally, Varian 
assumes every firm to have declining average 
costs, with no capacity constraint. Firms are 
allowed to pursue mixed strategies. Thus they 
may randomly choose a different price each 
period (a "week"). If this turns out to be the 
lowest price, the firm sells to its share of the 
uninformed consumers and all the informed; 
otherwise, it sells only to the uninformed 
that week and loses money. Varian proves 
the existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium 
in which all prices are charged with positive 
probability, from the lowest, where price 
equals average cost for the successful firm 
that captures all the informed consumers plus 
its share of the ignorant, to the highest, 
which equals the limit price. 
This model relaxes the rational expecta-
tions assumption, for the uninformed con-
sumers in it are not assumed to know the 
price distribution, but its assumptions re-
specting firm costs and the method of infor-
mation acquisition are again unrealistic. So 
also may be its assumption respecting the 
way firms price. To see why this is so, sup-
pose that on Tuesday a firm sends in its ad 
to the newspaper with its price for the fol-
lowing week; on Monday morning of that 
week the newspaper comes out and the firm 
then learns that it does not have the lowest 
price. It then has an incentive to raise its 
price to the limit price for the rest of the 
week. The model implicitly, but question-
ably, assumes that such price increases will 
not be made. Firms adhere to advertised 
prices because in some circumstances they 
are legally bound to do so and because alter-
ing advertised prices could cause goodwill 
losses if consumers commonly assume those 
prices to be fixed for short periods. Con-
sumers in this model who visit a firm that is 
not low for the week, however, have not 
observed the firm's ad; if they had, they 
would also have observed the ad of the lowest 
priced competitor and gone there. No legal 
prohibition against altering prices on which 
consumers do not rely exists, nor is goodwill 
a factor because consumers would not know 
that the price they see has been raised. If 
neither the law nor the prospect of lost 
goodwill are relevant to firms, however, they 
would maximize profits by raising prices to 
the limit whenever they were not low, in 
which case the equilibrium in this model 
actually could involve all but one firm charg-
ing the monopoly price in each period. 
For these and other reasons, Varian's 
imaginative model is difficult for decision 
makers to apply. Any welfare gains in it 
resulting from the state making information 
easier to get depends on prohibiting firms 
that were not low for a given week from 
raising their prices; this may be a difficult 
prohibition to enforce. Also, the model shows 
that the prices paid by informed consumers 
could decrease with increases in the size of 
the uninformed group, making the welfare 
effect of legal intervention ambiguous. Until 
these difficulties are resolved, it is difficult to 
distil directives for action from this model. 
In an important sense, the qualms we have 
expressed about these models are beside the 
point; the models reflect thoughtful attempts 
to deal with even more serious defects in 
prior work and their authors apparently were 
not intent on producing analyses that would 
be immediately useful to decision makers. 
Nevertheless, the reliance of these search 
equilibrium models on strong versions of the 
rational expectations assumption combined 
with their use of imaginary institutions by 
which consumers become informed are the 
source of some difficulty even when the 
models are taken on their own terms. In 
particular, they seem responsible for the 
"discontinuous" nature of the equilibria these 
models generate, which are of concern theo-
retically. Also, given the great amount of 
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regulation that has been passed to cure the 
allegedly harmful effects of imperfect infor-
mation, it now seems useful for economists 
to address the questions that decision makers 
should want answered. The Salop and Stig-
litz model and its various extensions thus are 
best viewed as "worst-case" examples of what 
may occur when information acquisition 
costs are positive. A useful next step is to 
develop models intermediate to them and the 
neoclassical models discussed in the intro-
duction to this paper. One way to do this is 
to weaken further the rational expectations 
assumption and to assume that consumers 
use more realistic methods of information 
acquisition. 
An example of such a model can be found 
in our 1979 article. In this model consumers 
learn of prices by visiting stores, and shop 
pursuant to a fixed sample size strategy, with 
some consumers having sample sizes equal-
ing one and others having sample sizes strictly 
greater than one. These assumptions differ 
from the standard ones in three ways. First, 
the method of acquiring information is rea-
sonably realistic since consumers often do 
learn of prices by visiting stores. Second, no 
one in this model is perfectly informed, in 
the sense of knowing the distribution and the 
identity of all firms; rather, consumers only 
know what their limited samples reveal. 
Third, the shopping strategy it posits is con-
sistent with much of what is known about 
actual shopping behavior, since in all markets 
studied some consumers visit one and others 
more than one store, and the "shoppers" 
sometimes return to earlier stores to take 
advantage of favorable prices. 
This model is similar in its assumptions 
respecting consumer preferences and firm 
technology to the modified version of the 
Salop and Stiglitz model discussed above. 
The only difference is that a now refers to 
the proportion of comparison shoppers and 
n to the number of stores they visit (n;;;;., 2). 
Three qualitatively distinct equilibrium con-
figurations emerge in this model: (i) if a 
significant proportion of consumers sample 
more than one firm, a competitive equi-
librium occurs; (ii) if somewhat fewer con-
sumers shop, the equilibrium distribution will 
have a mass point at p*, a gap in which no 
prices are charged and a continuous distri-
bution of prices above that to the limit price 
PL; (iii) if still fewer consumer shop, the 
equilibrium distribution of prices will be 
continuous over some range [ p, p Ll where 
p;;., p*. In this final case, prises as a falls; 
prices thus begin to mass toward the monop-
oly price as the percentage of comparison 
shoppers gets small. 
This model suggests that monopolistic 
competition sometimes is not the appropriate 
market structure in which to analyze imper-
fect information issues. Some theorists, as 
the introduction noted, have employed this 
theory to characterize market outcomes when 
information about price is costly to acquire 
in part because of their view that price dis-
persion may be common; when dispersion 
exists, price must exceed marginal cost for at 
least some firms, and this disparity is an 
inevitable feature of monopolistically com-
petitive equilibria. Our model, however, 
makes no presumption that search costs are 
zero for the comparison shoppers, but a 
classic competitive equilibrium still can ob-
tain in it. In addition, a normative implica-
tion of the model is that policymakers should 
consider curing the effects of costly search 
by reducing the costs to consumers of di-
rectly comparing purchase alternatives. Stud-
ies of actual markets suggest that such cost 
reductions can substantially lower prices; see 
for example, D. G. Devine and B. W. Ma-
rion (1979). 
This model nevertheless is primitive. Ini-
tially, the model was designed to be of some 
help to decision makers in evaluating a 
market's competitive state if goods are ho-
mogeneous, but it is unilluminating if hetero-
geneity exists and consumers shop across 
quality levels or if firms can price dis-
criminate. Since product heterogeneity is 
more often characteristic of monopolistic 
competition than homogeneity, the policy 
implications of our model would appear only 
to be relevant to a small number of markets. 
Further, the model makes the standard but 
strong assumptions that firms have perfect 
information about the prices other firms 
charge and that consumers purchase one good 
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or none; it treats consumers' search strate-
gies as exogenously determined; and while it 
is relatively simple from a formal point of 
view, it is still difficult for decision makers to 
apply. 
II 
The analysis above implies that a useful 
task, from a theoretical viewpoint, is to see 
what equilibria would occur in models that 
drop the rational expectations assumption, 
assume real world methods of information 
acquisition and relatively plausible consumer 
search strategies and endow firms with re-
alistic cost functions. Such models would be 
more likely to illuminate actual phenomena, 
and might provide the basis for empirical 
research or laboratory experiments that actu-
ally could test the effects of insufficient 
search on economic environments. These re-
alistic models would also be helpful to 
policymakers for the reasons previously given 
and for another important reason. Because it 
is so difficult to test economic theories di-
rectly, the attractiveness of a model to deci-
sion makers becomes a function of the inher-
ent plausibility of the economic story that it 
tells, and this plausibility is itself largely a 
function of the realism of the model's specifi-
cations. Search equilibrium models have not 
been used by decision makers in part be-
cause of the strength of the assumptions they 
have made. 
A policy focus also suggests relaxing the 
homogeneity assumption. This is because a 
crucial question, when price dispersion is 
observed, is whether it is a function of insuf-
ficient search, which suggests inefficiency, or 
of heterogeneity. Our forthcoming paper ad-
dresses this question using a model in which 
goods of two qualities are sold and con-
sumers have very imprecise information re-
specting the prices and qualities that obtain 
at any given firm. In consequence, the con-
sumers are assumed to shop randomly across 
quality levels. The model characterizes neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for both goods 
to trade at their competitive prices. This 
model yields three results: (i) heterogeneous 
goods markets are more likely to segment 
into roughly homogeneous subsets than is 
commonly supposed; (ii) when markets do 
not segment, heterogeneity can work to di-
lute the effectiveness of search, since, for 
example, a consumer who visits two stores 
that sell different qualities is in effect a non-
shopper for both varieties; (iii) increases in 
quality density, sample sizes held constant, 
reduce the likelihood of competitive equi-
libria, since search becomes dissipated by the 
range of qualities. This model nevertheless 
only begins to explore the implications of 
heterogeneity. Its major defect, from a policy 
perspective, is that it fails to characterize 
equilibria intermediate between competitive 
and monopoly, and thus it is unhelpful to 
decision makers who want to know whether 
a particular heterogeneous goods market is 
behaving well or badly. An important next 
step, then, is for search equilibrium models 
formally to incorporate product and contract 
term heterogeneity. 
Finally, the economic analysis to date has 
been of limited use to policymakers because 
the formal models deal only with search 
goods, all of whose properties are observable 
before purchase. Much regulation, however, 
deals with goods or services that have experi-
ence or credence qualities. The best formal 
treatment of this case is found in Mark Sat-
terthwaite (1979). This paper analyzes a 
model of the medical services market and 
shows how an increase in the supply of 
physicians can cause prices to rise because 
the supply increase reduces the effectiveness 
of consumer search. Extending Satter-
thwaite's model or developing new models to 
deal with experience goods would obviously 
be useful. 
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